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6 The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA (AANZFTA) 
MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS I. Introduction The ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand F'fA (AANZFTA) combines two different pre­existing country groupings oflong-standing. The first of these is ASEAN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, which was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Slngapore and Thailand. 1 This grouplng has expanded over the years, with Brunei Darussalam joining in 1984, followed by Vietnam in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. While ASEAN has existed for nearly 50 years, for most of that period it has served as an alliance based on economic and political cooperation rather than as a free trade agreement. However, the original members of ASEAN launched a free trade initiative, the ASEAN hee Trade Area (AFTA), in 1992.2 In 2003, after the expansion of ASEAN to its current membership, ASEAN announced plans to create an ASEAN Community comprising three pillars, one of which would be a free trade agreement to be called the ASEAN Economic Community. In 2007, this intention was memorialized in writing with a timetable to form the Community by 2015.3 The other pre-existing alliance was that between Australia and New Zealand, which have a long history of formal trade agreements. In 1965, close in time to the creation of ASEAN, these Oceania neighbours formed a free trade agreement known as the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement. This FTA was eclipsed in 1983 by the highly ambitious Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (ANZCERTA), most commonly referred to as Closer Economic Relations (CER).4 Given the linkages already in place between the A SEAN countries on the one hand, and Australia and New Zealand on the other, the primary trade gains to be had pursuant to AANZFT A lie in new linkages between Australia and New Zealand 
I Por a detailed discmsion of ASEAN's formation, sec The founding of ASEAN, www.aseanscc.org/ 
thefounding-of -asean/. Accessed 10 October 2013. 
2 Implementation of AFJ'A has occurred slowly. For a history of APTA, see Jiro Okamoto, 'The AFl'A-CER 
Linkage Dialogue: an Endeavour for Closer Relations between SRTAs within APEC', in Satoru Okuda (ed.}, 
Trade Libemlization and Facilitati:on in APEC: A Re-evaluation of APBC Activities ( 1998), available aL www. 
idc.go.jp/English/Publish/Download/ Apcc/ 12.html. 
3 See Overview, ww·1v.asean.org/asean/about-asean/overview (last visited 8 Augu.11, 2013). 
4 Closer Economic Relations (CER), Australian High Commission New Zealand, www.austrnlia.org.nz/wltn/ 
CloseEconRel.html. Accessed 10 October 2013. 
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115 '1' HF: ASE AN AUST RA I.I A ·NF, W :l F. AL ANO D TA (AA N Z FT A) and specific ASEAN members. Indeed, pursuant to an exchange of letters bearing treaty status, Australia and New Zealand have agreed that AANZFTA obligations only apply between them to a limited extent, including the tariff and Rules of Origin (ROO) commitments and the General Exceptions chapter.5 Following several years of negotiations, these two groupings formed the ASEAN­Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (AANZFTA), which came into force on 1 January 2010 for most of its pa11icipants. AANZT·TA has been in effect for all participants since January 2012. This chapter reviews the negotiating history of AANZFTA, discusses some of its more noteworthy provisions, and discusses its future prospects. On l'he whole, this agreement is not particularly ambitious and as such can be viewed as a lost oppor­tunity. However, to the extent the parties wished to form a linkage for political or strategic reasons, which is likely, the lack of economic gains was likely not a major consideration. A 2000 study concluded thal creating AANZFTA would result in gains to Australia of US$19.l billion between the years 2000 and 2020; gains to New Zealand of $3.4 billion; and co.Uective gains to the ASEAN members of $25.6 millio11.6 This study was over-optimistic and unrealistic, in that it assumed all tariffs within the FTA would be reduced to zero within five years of the treaty being in effect.7 This would have been a significantly more rapid implementation period than that found in most Fl'As (usually ten years), and indeed the final agreement did not apply a five-year phase-out period. Although the actual gains of AANZVf A will not be known for some time, they may additionally prove to be substantially more modest than predicted in 2000, not only due to the over-ambitious and unrealistic estimates but also because Australia and New Zealand both formed FT As with certain of the ASEAN members after 2000 but prior to entering into AANZFTA. In terms of the benefits perceived by the parties, the formation of the various bilateral FTAs meant that under AANZFTA, the potential for market access gains was more significant with respect to certain bilateral linkages than others. In particular, New Zealand already had in place free trade agreements ·with Singapore,8 Brunei and Singapore,9 Thailand10 and 
5 New 7.ealand Ministry ofl'oreign Affairs .ind Trade, Agreement Establishing 11,e ASEAN-Austrnlia-New 
Zealand free 'l'ri:ide Arca (Febrnnry 2009) preface. 
6 Report of the High-Level Task l'orcc on the AFTA-CER Free Trade Area, 'The Angkor Agenda' (2000). For 
a discussion of this repo1t and the re1>ort that preceded it in I 997 sec David Caruso, • Prnsperity in Co• 
Operation: The ASEAN-Australia-Ncw 7,ealand Pree Trade Agreement (AANZFTA)'. 11 /. World Inv. & 
1'rade 197, 203 (20 I 0). 
7 Caru.10, supra note 6, at 203. 
8 Singapore-New Zealand Closer P.conomk Partner,hip ( I January 2001). 
9 Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement (together with 11011-ASEAN member Chile) 
(2006). 
10 Thailand-New Zealand Closer Economic Partnership (I July 2005). 
u6 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS Malaysia.11 For New Zealand therefore, the biggest market access gains were to be had with respect to new opportunities in the export markets of Indonesia, the Philippines and Vietnam.12 New Zealand attributed less priority to its new ties with ASEAN's least­developed country members, Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar, as New Zealand exports to these markets are negligible.13 Australia also had FTAs in effect with individual ASEAN members Singapore14 and Thailand15 prior to the entry into force of AANZFTA. Perhaps reflecting the limited ambition of the multi-party agreement, Australia entered into its own bilateral FTA with Malaysia following the entry into force of AANZFl'A.16 One area in which Australia perceived significant potential gains was in the services sector. In the years leading up to AANZFT A's conclusion, Australian exports of services to ASEAN countries had risen 13.7 percent to US$4.62 billion with particular growth in transportation services and travel services.17 Australia had a significant level of education services-related exports to ASEAN countries, the largest of which collectively totaled $2.2 billion in 2007.18 Services trade with Australia also represented an opportunity for ASEAN. By 2007, Australia was importing US$5.6 billion worth of services from ASEAN countries, with particular growth experienced in transportation services and travel scrvices.19 New Zealand also hoped to expand what was already a growing market for its exports. In 2009, just prior to AANZFTA coming into force, ASEAN was New Zealand's third largest export market.20 New Zealand and Australia saw potential benefits in harmonizing applicable rules and tariffs across their trade with ASE AN countries. In addition, they were interested at chipping away at the stringent regulations throughout ASEAN countries (such as prohibitions on foreigners practicing certain occupations; foreign equity caps; and prohibitions on foreign ownership of land) that limited the ability of CER businesses to provide services or invest in ASEAN.21 fn addition to the bilateral ties existing between Australia and/or New Zealand and individual ASEAN countries, the two AANZFT A negotiating groups (ASEAN and Australia/New Zealand) have a lengthy history of cooperation long pre-dating AANZFTA. In 1993, then-Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand Supachai Panitchpakdi 11 New Zealand-Malaysia I'rec Trade Agreement (26 October 2009). 12 New Zealand Ministry of foreign Affairs and Trade, Agreement Establishing the ASEAN-/iustra/iu-New Zealand Free Trade Area (February 2009) 12. 13 Ibid., 12. 14 Singapore-Australia I'rce Trade Agreement (28 July 2003). 15 Thailand-Australia Free Trade Agreement (1 January 2005). 16 Malaysia-Australia l'ree Trade Agreement (1 January 2013). 17 Joseph Purugganan, Closer 'J'ies, Larger Markels: Examining the ASEAN rTAs, 13 February 2009, available at ww·w.bilaterals.org/spip.php?page"' print&id _article=J 4394. 18 Ibid. 19 National TnLeresl Analysis, Agreement Estub/i.>hing The ASP.AN-Austral i a -New ;(.ea/and Free '/'rade Area 
(And Associated Instruments) (New '.ualand) (2009) 11 lhereinafter 'National Interest Analysis']. 20 New Zealand Ministry of I'orcign Affairs and Trade, Agreement Establishing the J\SF'AN-1ru.>tra/ i a -New 7-ea/and Free Trade Area (February 2009), 2. 21 Camso, supra note 6, at 2[)4. 
THE ASEAN-AUSTRALlA-NI\W ZUALANJ) JlTA (AAN7.l'TA) 117 suggested that AFTA and CER form closer economic ties.22 Australia welcomed this suggestion, and thereafter so did New Zealand and other ASEAN members. The first informal consultations between ministers from A.SEAN and CER members Australia and New Zea.land took place in 1995 in Brunei; at these meetings, the ministers agreed in princip.le to form linkages between the two trading blocs. 23 However, as AFTAwasonly at the very beginning of a lengthy implementation period, discussions proceeded for many yea.rs along the lines of trade facilitation and cooperation, rather than the joining of two trade agreements.21 Nonetheless, the groupings developed a practice of meeting regularly. In 2000, at the fifth A.SEAN Economic Ministers (AEM)-CER Consultations, the Ministers considered the Angkor Agenda: Report of the High Level Task Force on the Feasibility of an AFTACER Free Trade Area, which recommended the formation of an ASEAN-CER PTA. 25 However, it took several years before this proposal was acted upon formally. At the 2004 ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Commemorative 26Summit, the leaders agreed to launch formal FTA negotiations early in 2005.e The parties agreed that tl,e Agreement would he a comprehensive agreement, covering trade in goods, services and investment.27 The negotiations commenced on schedule in early 2005 and, after 16 rounds of negotiations, were substantively concluded in late August 2008.28 The Agreement was signed in Thailand on 27 February 2009.29 The AANZFTA parties account for approximately 643 million people and US$4 30trillion in GDP (2012).e The Agreement is unique in that it represents the only time in which Australia and New Zealand have jointly negotiated an FT A with third countries. It was also ASEAN's first Fl'A in which the negotiations covered all sectors 
31from the beginning.e II. The negotiating process The leaders of the participating countries agreed to a comprehensive set of "Guiding Principles" for the ncgotiations.32 The Guiding Principles committed countries to negotiate an agreement that covers goods, services and investment; the progressive elimination of all forms of barriers to trade and investment; and full implementation within ten years.33 The negotiations were in the main 
22 Okamoto, sup-ra nole 2, at 12. 23 Olmso, supra note 6, at 201. 24 Okamato.supra nolc: 2, at l2-13. 
25 Sec Angkor Agenda, www.dfat.gov.au/tradc/fta/aseaJ1/aanzfta/angkor_agenda.pdf. 
26 Michael Mugliston. Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Australia, Negatiating the ASEAN­Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, 8. 
27 Sec the Report of the High-Level Task Force on the A F T A -CEl{ l'ree Trade Area (lhe Angkor Agenda), 
Executive Sun:unary, paragraph 9. 
28 Ibid. 29 What i�A.AN£f'TA? http://aan'l:fta.ascan.org/. Accessed 16 October 2013. 
30 ASEAN-Austral i a -New Zealand Free Trade Area snapshot, www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/. Accessed 27 
September 2013. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Guiding Principles for Negotiating on ASMN-Australia-New 7.ealand Pree ·rrade Area, Department of 
foreign AITairs and Tr.1de of Australia, available at www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/principlcs.html, 
33 Ibid. 
118 MEREDITH KOT.SKY LEWIS 
concluded at the ASEAN Economic Ministers-CER Trade Ministers meeting in 
August 2008. Bilateral negotiations between Australia on the one hand and 
each of Indonesia and Malaysia on the other continued for a few more months 
over the issue of automotive tariff commitments, wilh the agreement formally 
signed in February 2009.34 Although the negotiations were conducted between 
Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN as an entity, the completed FTA has 
resulted in separate market access commitments for Australia, New Zealand 
and each of the ten ASEAN member countries.35 
The following is a general timeline of AANZFTA, from earliest linkages through to 
entering into force: 
• Early 1990s: Australia initialed efforts to create links between the ASEAN Free 
Trade Area (AFTA) and the Australia-New Zealand Closer Economic Relations 
(CER) agreement. 
• November 1993: Former Deputy Prime Minister of Thailand (Supachai 
Panitchpakdi) publicly spoke in favor of linking AFl'A and CER. 
• September 1995: Ministers from ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand infor­
mally agreed to "region to region linkages" between AF'J'A and CER. 
• October 1999: High Level Task Force established to assess feasibility of an AFT A­
CER Free Trade Area. 
• October 2000: The High Level Task Force issued its report "The 
Angkor Agenda" which expressed support for an AFTA-CER free trade 
agreement. 
• September 2002: AFTA-CER Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) established. 
• November 2004: Leaders from ASEAN, Australia and New Zealand agreed to 
launch comprehensive FTA negotiations. 
• March 2005: AANZFTA negotiations commenced. 
• 2005-2008: 16 rounds of negotiations took place. 
• 27 February 2009: ASEAN, Australian and New Zealand Ministers signed 
AANZFTA in Thailand.36 
Following the signing of the Agreement, ratification took place over the subsequent 
three years, as follows: 34 Mug list on, supra note 26, at I 2. 35 Uackground to the 1\SEAN-Australia-1\'ew ;(,ea/and Free Trade Area, Department of foreign Affairs an<l Trade of AtLstralia available at www.dfat.gov.aultia/aanzfta/hackgroun<l-to-AANZFTA.html. 36 The hi8tory through this item is derived from the document AS�AN-Australia-New 7ealand l'TA Tirneline, Department of Poreign Affairs and Trade of Amtralia available at wi.vw.dfat.gov.au/fta/ aanzfta/timeline.hlm\. Further background on AANZF'l'A can be found on the AANZI'TA wcbpages of ASEAN (http://aanzfta.asean.org/); the Amtralian Department of foreign A ft air� and Trade (www.<lfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/index.html); and the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs an<l 'l'rade (wwi.'l'.asean.fla.govl.nz/). 
ll.9 THE ASF.AN· AUSTRALIA-NEW :{.£ALAND fTA (AAN:t.FTA) • 1 January 2010: Agreement came into force for Australia, New Zealand, Brunei, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam. • 12 March 2010: Agreement came into force for Thailand. • I January 2011: Agreement came into force for Laos. • 4 January 2011: Agreement came into force for Cambodia. • 10 January 2012: Agreement came into force for Indonesia. Because of the challenges of establishing a structure for negotiations amongst twelve countries, the first phase of the negotiating process revolved around establishing the procedural and organizational frameworks for the talks.37 The parties decided that the negotiations would be co-chaired by Australia, New %ealand and Brunei (acting as ASEAN Coordinator), and that rounds of negotiations would rotate amongst Australia, an ASEAN member and New Zealand.38 Working groups were established for a number of topics, including rules of origin, investment and services, with sub-working groups handling other issues, including Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures and customs issues. Overlaying these groupings was a Trade Negotiating Committee, which was responsible, inter alia, for negotiating topics not covered by working 39 groups or sub-groups. Although technically all FTA topics were included in the negotiations from the beginning, in practice, certain issues proved to be controversial and it was not feasible to commence negotiations on these topics - notably intellectual property and economic cooperation - until quite late in the negotiations. Indeed the relevant working groups for intellectual property (IP) and economic cooperation were not even established until the last year of the AANZFT A talks.401he negotiating process with respect to economic cooperation featured a variety of capacity-building activities led by Australia and New Zealand to assist ASEAN negotiators with the substantive negotiations. These activities included sessions covering the nuts and bolts of technical issues such as how to assess trade data; understanding rules of origin; and the in tricacies of scheduling commit­ments in investment and seIViccs.�·1 As is often the case in FTA negotiations, talks proceeded simultaneously in a variety of' settings. Working Groups held discussions amongst all the parties, and subsets of the parties, as well as bilaterally. While negotiations were held formally within the Trade Negotiating Committee, there were also numerous discussions held less formally between rounds, again in groups of varying 
· 42
SIZCS. 37 Mugli,ton, supra note 26, al 9. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. 42 Jbid., at lo. 
120 MEREDITH KOi.SKY LEWIS The market access negotiations were primarily bilateral in nature, with Australia and New Zealand each meeting separately with each ASEAN country to negotiate commitments on tariffs and services.13 tA significant issue affecting the negotiations was the vasly different levels of devel­opment amongst the parUcipants, ranging from Au�tralia and New Zealand as developed countries to Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar as Least Developed Countries (LDCs), and the other ASEAN countries in various stages of development. 'J'his variation in devel­opment led to discussions over what degree of differentiation of obligations should be permitted, as well as to differences in opinion over the scope of the substantive commit­ments. With respect lo differentiating obligations, the parties agreed that the timeframes for implementation would vary based on development level, with Australia and New Zealand having the least time to implement, the LDC members having the most time, the more developed members of ASEAN falling in between, and Vietnam getting less time than the LDCS to implement, but more than the other ASEAN members.44 With re,�pect to the scope of the obligations, there were differences of opinion over both the depth of tariff cuts and whether certain issues should be covered by AANZFT A at all. The ASEAN members were not pleased with the idea that everyone should lower tariffs to, or nearly to, zero, because Australia's and New Zealand's tariff levels were already quite low, while on the whole ASEAN's tariffs were significantly higher (with the exception of Singapore), meaning that ASEAN would be making most of the tariff concessions.45 On the issue of subject matter coverage, Australia and New Zealand would have liked to have had commitments on government procurement, but ASEAN was not willing to include such commitments as they had never featured in any previous ASEAN FTA,�6 The disagreements over coverage did not entirely run along the lines of Australia and New Zealand seeking inclusion and ASEAN objecting. For example, Australia refused to accept ASEAN's proposed approach to disciplines on SPS mea­sures.47 This is not surprising given that Australia has imposed numerous SPS measures on tropical products from ASEAN countries, giving rise to a number of trade disputes.48 III. Analysis of noteworthy obligations A. Impact of AANZFT A on pre-existing agreements Under the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),49 it is generally the case that a later-in-time treaty will trump an earlier treaty to which the 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid., at I I. 46 lbid. 47 Ibid. 48 For example, in 2002 the Philippines made a formal request for consul\aliuos with Australia over its ban on importation of cerlain fresh fruits and vegetables from the Philippines. See A uslralia - C.:ertain Measures Af ecting the Importation of fresh Fruit and Vegetables - Request for Consultations by the l'hilippincs, WTI DS270/l (23 October 2002). A panel was established in 2003, bul never composed (meaning that panelist, were never appointed), presumably due to ao agreemeot amongst the parties Lo suspend lhe proceedings. 19 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 30, 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331. 
121 THE ASliAN-AUSTRALJA-NIJW 7.RALAND "PTA (AANZF'!'A) same countries belong. In particular, Article 30 addresses the "Application of succes­sive treaties relating to the same subject-matter" and provides: 
3. When all the partic� to the earlier treaty are parties also Lo the later treaty but 
the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in llperation under article 59, 
the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible 
with those of the later treaty. 
4. When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier 
one: 
(a) as between States Parties to both treaties tbe same rule applies as in 
paragraph 3; Notwithstanding the language of VCLT Article 30, the AANZFT A parties did not want the later-in-time rule to apply automatically. Indeed, in the Guiding Principles established for the negotiations, the parties specified that: "AFTA and CER will continue to exist as distinct, functioning agreements, as will the FTAs between ASEAN Member Countries, Australia and New Zealand. No provision in the Ff A will detract from the terms and conditions of bilateral and plurilateral FT As between ASEAN Member Countries, Auslralia and New Zealand."5° Consistent with this principle, in Chapter 18 (Final Provisions) the parties set out in some detail the intended interplay between AANZFf A and other agreements. In particular, Article 2, Relation to Other Agreements provides: 1. Each Party reaffirms its rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement and other agreements to which the Parties are party. 2. Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to derogate from any right or obligation of a Party under the WTO Agreement and other agreements to which the Parties are party. 3. In the event of any inconsistency between this Agreement and any other agreement to which two or more Parties are party, such Parties shall immediately consult with a view to finding a mutually satisfactory solution. 4. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent any individual ASf.AN Member State from entering into any agreement with any one or more ASEAN Member State and/or Australia and/or New Zealand relating to trade in goods, trade in services, investment, and/or other areas of economic co-operation. The provisions of this Agreement shall not apply to any agreement among ASEAN Member States. The provL�ions of this Agreement shall al<io not apply to any agreement involving any ASEAN Member State and/or Australia and/or New Zealand unless otherwise agreed by the parties to that agreement. 
50 e.;uicling Principles for Negotiation on ASP.AN· -Auslr�lia-New Zc:iland Free Trade Area (I). Accessible at 
www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aan1.fta/principleslitml. 
122 MEREDl'l'll KOi.SKY LEWIS Thus it appears that the parlies did not intend for AANZFTA to take precedence over any intra-ASEAN agreements under any circumstances. For any other possible inconsistencies (e.g. those arising between AANZFTA and an agreement between an ASEAN member and Australia or New Zealand, or between AANZFTA and CER) it appears the parties can negotiate over what the outcome should be, but in any event, there is no automatic trumping of AANZFTA over other treaties in effect between various of the parties. It should be noted however that a footnote to Article 2 subparagraph 4 provides: "(l] This Paragraph does not apply to any future agreement concluded in accordance with this Agreement." Therefore Arlicle 2 only applies to agreements already in place at the time AANZFTA took effect. B. Substantive scope of the agreement The Agreement comprises 18 chapters and 9 annexes. The chapters are as follows: -'1 Chapter 1: Establishment of Free Trade Area, Objectives and General Definitions Chapter 2: Trade in Goods Chapter 3: Rules of Origin Chapter 4: Customs Procedures Chapler 5: Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Chapter 6: Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformily Assessment Procedures Chapter 7: Safeguard Measures Chapter 8: Trade in Services Chapter 9: Movement of Natural Persons Chapter 10: Electronic Commerce Chapter 11: Investment Chapter 12: Economic Co-operation Chapter 13: Intellectual Property Chapter 14: Competition Chapter 15: General Provisions and Exceptions Chapter 16: Institutional Provisions Chapter 17: Consultations and Dispute Settlement Chapter 18: Final Provisions. Although AANZFT A is not a particularly ambitious FT A, it does go beyond the coverage of the W'fO in some areas, parlicularly in its inclusion of chapters addressing e-commerce, investment and competition, as well as its coverage of movement of natural persons as a separate issue from trade in services. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss each of the chapters of AANZFTA in detail; 
51 AAN7.FTA, Table of Contents. '!'lie text of the AANZPTA is available al hllp://a,ean.fta.govt.nz/preamhle/. 
123 T'HJ.:; ASEAN -AUSTRAT.I.11.-NEW ZliALAND FTA (AANZPTA) however, the following identifies some of the noteworthy provisions within the substantive chapters of the Agreement. 1. Goods The chapter on Trade in Goods provides for the substantial reduction or elimination of tariffs between the parties pursuant to schedules set forth in Annex 1 of the Agreement.52 The schedules provide for different percentages of tariff lines to be reduced to zero by benchmark years, with the percentages varying by participant, with Singapore liberalizing the fastest and the four less-developed ASEAN members the slowest. For example, Singapore committed to reducing all tariffs to zero by 2010; Australia committed to lowering 96.5 percent of its tariff lines to zero by 2013, and 100 percent by 2020; New Zealand will similarly remove all tariffs to zero by 2020, but only had to remove tariffs on 90.3 percent of tariff lines by 2013. The other partici­pants committed to reducing a lesser percentage of tariff lines to zero, with differing deadlines for doing so. Brunei is scheduled to bring 90 percent of tariff lines to zero by 2013, and 98.9 percent by 2020; Indonesia is to reduce 85 percent of tarifftlines to zero by 2013, with a final commitment of 93.2 percent by 2025; Malaysia is scheduled to remove tariffs on 90.9 percent of tariff lines by 2013 and 96.3 percent by 2020; the Philippines committed to removing tariffs on 91 percent of tariff Jines by 2013 and a final commitment of 94.6 percent of tariff lines by 2020; and Thailand is to remove tariffs on 87.2 percent of tariff lines by 2013 and 99 percent by 2020. The four less­developed ASEAN members (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) all have longer phase-out periods and lesser phase-out commitments than do the other participants, and most of their significant tariff cuts do not begin until 2014 or later.53 Myanmar need only remove tariITs on 3.6 percent of tariff lines by 2013 (its existing base tariff levels), but is to remove tariffs on 85.2 percent of its tariff lines by 2024; Cambodia similarly did not need to make any tariff reductions until after 2013, until which time only 4. 7 percent oflines were at zero. It is ultimately to remove tariffs on 88 percent of its tariff lines by 2024. Laos did not have any tariff lines at zero at the outset, and did not need to make any tariff reductions until after 2013. It must remove tariff,; on 88 percent of its tariff lines by 2023. Vielnam also had no commitments until 2013, but had a base oft29.3 percent of tariff lines at zero; it must increase this to 89.8 percent by 2020>'4 C..ertain countries made no commitments with respect to a number of tariff lines. In the case of the Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia and Laos, this represented only a few tariff lines, whereas for otl1ers, significantly more lines are unbound. Unbound tariff lines include: for the Philippines, rice, sugar and some steel products; for Brunei, alcoholic 
52 AANZFTA, Aunt'.x l. 
53 Ib1.d. 1-'or a graphic depiction of the different tariff redLJction commitments, sec Roheno Bergami, 'Rules, 
Regulations & Procedures of the Asean•Auslralia-New Zcahrnd Free Trade Area (AANZl'TA)', 14 Vlndobona ]. Int'/ Comm'/ L. & Arb. 319, 332-33 (2010). 
54 ibid. See also www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzfta/annexcs/annexl_tc.htnil. 
124 MERilDITH KOLSKY LEWIS beverages, tobacco products and military weapons; for Malaysia, rice, alcoholic bev­erages, tobacco products, and used pneumatic tires; for Laos, drug-related products including cannabis, opium extracts and alkaloids, cocaine and similar products. Although Laos only has a few unbound tariff lines, it will still have high tariffs in 55place in 2025 for motor vehicles and most wcapons. Indonesia and Thailand have somewhat more unbound tariff lines. For Indonesia, these include rice, sugar, alcoholic beverages, certain categories of soybeans and tobacco products, waste pharmaceuticals, as well as a number of agricultural machin­ery, specialized transport, and oil drilling -related items; and for Thailand, unsweet­ened milk and cream, onions, potatoes, garlic, shallots, coconut, coffee and tea, pepper, certain corn, rice, soybeans, palm, coconut and soybean oils, sugar, UHT milk drinks, tobacco producls and raw silk.56 Cambodia, Vietnam and Myanmar have more unbound tariff lines than the other AANZFT A members. Cambodia's faJI across a wide range of products; in the main, the unbound tariff lines are a particular product or two within a larger category for which commitments were made, without wholesale exclusions. These include certain fresh fruits, juices, dairy products, cereals, fats, and sugars; selected paper products, personal hygiene items; steel producls; electronic and computer components, and certain furni­tun: items. In contrast, Vietnam has a similar nwnber of unbound lines, but concen­trated into fewer products and categories. Vietnam's exclusions include poppy seeds and extracts, petroleum oils and other oils, waste phannaceuticals, fireworks and other explosives, municipal and other waste, retreaded and used pneumatic tires, used clothing and rags� military weapons and many steel products. Myanmar's exclusions are also limited in categories, though not as concentrated as Vietnam's. Its unbound tariff lines include: poppy seeds and extracts, radioactive elements and related products, rare earth metal compounds, explosives, unused bank notes, monetary gold, gold and silver coins, explosives, nuclear reactors and components, military weapons and other firearms, armoured lighting vehicles, certain tables, works of art such as paintings, sculpture and prints, and antiques and other collectors' items.57 Notwithstanding the slow phase-outs for the developing country participants and a certain number of unbound tariff lines, Australia has estimated that by 2020, 96 percent of its exports to AANZFTA counLries will be duty-free, compared with only 67 percent upon entry into force of the Agreement in 2010.58 New Zealand has similarly estimated that by 2022, 99 percent of its exports will be duty-free to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, the countries with which it did not have an existing FTA and with which it engages in significant trade.59 
55 Ibid. 56 Jl,id. 57 Ibid. 
5/l Australian Depa.rtmmt of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ASEAN-Australia-Ncw Zealand Pree Trade 
Agreement (AANZFTA), Creating Business Opportunilies l. Accessible at www.<lfat.gov.au/fla/aanzftal 
AANZPT ACrcating-business-opportunities. pdf. 
59 New Zealand Ministry of foreign Affairs and Trade, Agreement Establishing the Asean-AustraUa-New 
L'.ealand Free '/'rade Area 2, accessible at www.ASEAN.FTAgovLll'l. 
125 THE ASEAN-AUSTRALJA-NF.W ZEALAND !'TA (AANZI''J'A) In addition to the provision for the phasing out of tariffs, the Agreement also provides for the immediate binding of tariffs to the applied rates in effect at the time of ratification, thus precluding AANZFTA members from raising tariffs on products for which their WTO bound rates were higher than their applied rates (which would have been permissible under W'fO rules).60 One interesting feature of the Trade in Goods chapter is a commitment, "[c]on­sistent with their rights and obligations under the WTO Agreement", to eliminate agricultural export subsidies and not to reintroduce them, for all agricultural pro­ducts destined for other AANZFTA parties.61 This is an unusual provision because it has generally been believed that agricultural export subsidies, as well as other sub­sidies, would not be easily susceptible to reductions outside the multilateral give-and­take process of the WTO. 2. Rules of Origin The Rules of Origin (ROO) chapter establishes the criteria for determining which goods qualify for preferential tariff treatment (i.e. they determine which products count as "Australian", "Indonesian", "Vietnamese" etc.). Under AANZFTA, the ROO permit originating goods to be cumulated between the parties and used in the production of further goods.62 The cumulation principle applies in the multi-party selling of AANZFTA, which means that a party's inputs, as long as they meet the originating criteria, not only gain preferential treatment when exported to another party, but can be counted as part of the qualifying content for goods produced and traded between all the parties. For products containing inputs from non-AANZFTA countries, the ROO varies depending on whether the change in tariff classification ( CTC) approach or regional value content (RVC) approach applies to the given product. If the CTC is applicable, a good will only qualify as originating from an AANZFTA country if every third party input has undergone a specified change of tariff classification. Under the RVC approach, a good will qualify as originating from an AANZFTA country if the third party content is no more than 60 percent of the FOB value.63 The applicable ROO varies depending on the type of product at issue, and some products have individualized R00.64 For example, a 40 percent RVC rule applies to motor vehicles and automotive parts, and an alternative process rule applies to certain textiles. For any good to qualify, il must be consigned directly between the partics.65 
60 See Australian Department of Porcign Affairs and Trade, Overview and Key Outcomes of the ASEAN­
Anstralia-New Zealand Free Tra<le Agreement (October 2009), acces.,ible al www.dfat.gov.au/fta/aanzf 
ta_ovcrview_and _outcomcs.html. Accessed 16 October 2013 [hereinafter 'Overview and Key Outcomes']. 
61 AANZFTA, Chapter 2, art. 3. 
62 National lnkrest Analysis a\ 32. For a detailed discussion of the AANZFJ'A ROO, sec Bergami, .1upra note 
53, at 322-31. 
63 National Interest Analysis at 32. 
64 l'roducl•specific rules of origin arc specified in Annex 2 to the Agreement. 
65 National lnteresl Analysis at 32; AANZFTA, Chapter 3, arl. 11. 
126 MEREDITH KOLSKY LEWIS 3. Customs procedures The Customs Procedures chapter includes non-binding commitments ("may" rather than "shall") to provide trade facilitation and cooperation to enhance the efficiency of customs procedures.66 In addition, it requires that customs procedures be designed to facilitate the clearance of low-risk items and to instead focus scrutiny on high-risk goods.67 4. SPS measures The SPS measures chapter refers repeatedly to the WTO's SPS Agreement. It contains several provisions to enhance cooperation, notably with respect to equivalence and regionalization,68 but does not appear to extend substantive obligations beyond those of the WTO SPS Agreement. Notably, AANZFTA consultations and dispute settle­ment procedures do not apply to the SPS chapter.69 5. Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment Procedures Similar to the SPS chapter, the Standards, Technical Regulations and Conformity Assessment Procedures (STRACAP) chapter refers heavily to the WTO's 'fBT Agreement and emphasizes cooperation in the establishment and maintenance of STRACAP measures in order to facilitate trade. Unlike the SPS chapter however, there is no exclusion for this chapter from the applicability of AANZFT A dispute settlement provisions. 6. Safeguards AANZFT A provides for the possibility of imposing safeguards during a transitional period upon a showing that the tariff cuts required by AANZFT A have led to increased imports sufhcient to cause serious injury to a domestic industry.70 Compensation must be negotiated for any such provisional safeguards imposed.71 7. Services The AANZFTA services chapter takes a positive list approach.72 The chapter is structured similarly to the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), except that it treats Mode 4 commitments under a separate "Movement of Natural Persons" chapter.73 The services chapter does not apply to measures affecting:7'1 
66 1\ANZI'TA, Chapler 4, arts.1 and 5. 67 lbid., al art. 9. 68 AANZFTA, Chapter 5, art�.� and 8. Sec also National lnlere.�l Analysis at 33. 69 AANZFl'A, Chapter 5, art. 11. 70 AAN7,PTA, Ciaptcr 7, art. 3. 71 !/!id., art. 8. 72 Sec Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, supru nok 26, at www.dfat.gov.au/ftalaan:tftalguidc/ australian__guide.html. 73 lbid. 74 i\ 1\NZr;TA, Chapter 8, art. 4. 
127 THE A SEAN A lJ S TRALIA-N .E W ZEA LAND J''l'A ( AANZFTA) (a) government procurement; (b) subsidies or grants including government-supported loans, guarantees, and insurance, provided by a Party or to any conditions attached to the receipt of such subsidies or grants, whelher or not such subsidies or grants are offered exclusively to domestic services, service consumers or service suppliers; (c) services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority within the territory of each respective Party, as defined in Article 2( q) (Delinitions),75 or (d) in respect of air transport services, measures affecting traffic rights however granted; or measures affecting services directly related to the exercise of traffic rights, other than measures affecting: (i) aircraft repair and maintenance senrices; (ii) the selling and marketing of air transport services; and (iii) computer reservation system services. The services commitments are not on the whole particularly ambitious. New Zealand made various GATS-plus commitments in AANZFTA; however, none of these commitments required New Zealand lo make any changes to its existing regulatory regime.76 Nonetheless, ASEAN did agree to some disciplines beyond their GATS commitments, including in financial and telecommunications services, that Australia 
77feels will benefit its industries. 8. Movement of natural persons This chapter comprises commitments, additional to those contained in the services and investment chapters, to facilitate the movement of natural persons for business purposes. 78 Refusals to grant temporary entry into an AANZF'J'A country are not subject to the consultations and dispute settlement chapter, except iC:79 (a) the matter involves a pattern of practice on the part of the granting Party; and (b) the natural persons affected have exhausted all available domestic remedies regarding the particular matters. The ASEAN countries obtained concessions in this area beyond what had been committed to in existing GATS commitments.80 9. Electronic commerce The e-commerce chapter comprises commitments to promote the use of electronic commerce; however, these provisions are all expressed in best efforts language (e.g., "shall, where possible"). Consistent with the lack of firm obligations, 
75 Defined as services that are not supplied on a commercial basis ,,or in competition with other service 
providers. 
76 National Interest Analysis at 36. 77 Ov�rvicw and Key Oulcumcs, 5upra note 56. 
78 AANZFTA, Chapter 9, art. 1. 79 Ibid., arl. 9. 
80 National lnter�:;t Analysis al .37. New Zealand's commitments nonetheless fell within its exi.1ling immigrn­
lion policy parnmelers. Ibid. 
128 MEREDTTH KOLSKY LEWIS this chapter is not subject to AANZFT A's consultations and dispute settlement chapter.81 10. Investment The AANZFTA investment chapter, Chapter 11, defines "investor" broadly, extend­ing natural person investor protections to permanent residents of AANZFTA coun­tries, as well as the more traditional coverage for nationals and citizens.82 In addition, juridical person investor protections extend to non-profit organizations, which is also unusual.83 The AANZFTA investment chapter does not contain any upfront com­mitments on market access. These commitments are to be negotiated and enter into force within five years of the entry into force of AANZFTA.84 Although core language on National Treatment has been agreed, the provisions of the Article shall not apply until such time as all 12 parties have agreed to the schedules of reservations to that language. Similarly, the investment chapter does not contain an MFN provision, which will also be the subject of future ncgotiation.85 The deferred approach to investment may reflect the fact that investment linkages between ASEAN and 86Australia have not been as strong as the trade relations between the two partners. Australia's total foreign direct investment (fl)l) in ASEAN in 2006 amounted to a mere US$399 million, accounting for less than one percent (0.8%) of total FDI inflows to ASEAN.87 Similarly, only two ASEAN countries have significant FDI stocks in Australia- Malaysia, with stocks of around US$2.6 billion and Singapore with US$3.3 billion worth of FDI.88 The chapter contains special and differential treatment provisions for the newest A SEAN members, largely in the form of technical assistance.89 The investment chapter provides for compulsory recourse to investor-state dispute settlement in the form of ICSID conciliation or arbitration, or arbitration under the UNCITRAL rules.90 In this regard, it is worth noting that Australia did not opt out of investor-state dispute settlement, as it succeeded in doing in the Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement and has vowed to do for all future PT As. 91 11. Economic Co-operation This chapter elaborates on the Economic Cooperation Work Programme (ECWP) to which the parties committed as a part of the formation of AANZFTA. The ECWP 
81 AAN7,FTA, Chapter 10, art. 10. 
82 AANZFTA, Chapter 11, art. 2. for commentary on AAN7.FTA's investment provisions, see Eckhard 
R. Hcllback, Investment Proteflion Under the New A.%AN-Austmlia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
(White & Case, 2010), accessible at www.whitecasc.com/idq/winter-20l0-4/#.Ulxl/4RCfJn5. 
83 lbid. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid. 87 Tbid. 88 Ibid. 89 AANZFl'A, Chapter 11, art. 15. 
90 Ibid., at arts. 18-22. 
91 See, e.g., Jurgen Kurtz, 'The Australian Trade Policy Statement on lnve.G\or-Slate Dispuk Settlement',ASIL Insights, 2 August 2011, accessible at www ,asil.orglinsights/volumc/15/issue/22/australian-trad�-policy­
statcmcnt-investor-sLaLe-di:;pute-scttlcrncnt. 
129 THE ASEAN-AUSTRALIA·-NEW :t;EALAND PTA (AANZF'rA) sets out eight areas of focus for cooperation:92 ROO, SPS measures, STRACAP, services, investment, intellectual property, sectoral integration and customs procedures. New Zealand estimated that its contribution to implement ECWP projects would be up to $4.6 million over three to five years - a relatively modest amount.93 This chapter is not subject to the consultations and dispute settlement chapter.94 12. Intellectual Property The intellectual property chapter provides for the establishment of an Intellectual Property Committee. The chapter requit:es the provision of criminal procedures and penalties for the willful infringement of copyright for commercial gain.95 lt also explicitly recognizes the right to protect genetic resources, traditional knowledge and folklore, albeit consistently with the WTO's Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.96 The chapter promotes cooperation on IP issues, including the provision of technical assistance to facilitate AANZFT A parties' ability to accede to, and implement, an elaborated list of IP treaties. 97 The IP chapter includes some commitments not found in TRIPS. For example, the parties agree to adhere to treaties not incorporated into TRIPS, such as the WIPO Patent Cooperation Treaty (WPCT), the Patent Law Treaty, and the Budapest Treaty on the International Recognition of the Deposit of Microorganisms for the Purposes of Patent Procedure.98 The agreement to abide by the WPCT will extend the period to file a patent application up to 30 months (rather than the 12 m011ths provided. for under the Paris Convention).99 Acceding to and implementing the other two treaties will lead to more harmonization on patent issues and simplify the process for obtaining certain patents.100 The intellectual property chapter also extends the TRIPS obligations to criminalize copyright piracy to situations where there is a willful infringement that, while not committed for commercial advantage or financial gain, has a "substantial prejudicial impact" on the right holder.101 13. Competition This brief chapter of only four articles is not subject to the AANZF'f A consultations and dispute set1lement chapter. 102 'lbe chapter primarily acknowledges competition­related principles, without requiring or precluding the adoption of any particular measures,103 and encourages cooperation, particularly in the form of assistance from Australia and New Zealand to the ASEAN countries. 104 
92 National lnb:rest Analysis at 39. 93 Ibid. 94 AAN7,FTA, Chapter 12, arl. 8. 
95 AANZFfA, Chapter 13, art. 5, 96 IfJid., art. R. 97 Ibid., art. 9(7). 
98 Jakkrit Kuanpoth, Thailand: Intellectual Property in J\SEAN-Australia-New Zealand PTA (J\A.1\fl:TA) 
(Tilleke & Gibbins Int'! Ltd. 2012), available at www.mondaq.com/x/166578/International+ Trade/ 
lnlellcctual+Property-tin+ASF.ANAtrntraliaNew+Zealand+FTA+AANFTA. 
99 Ibid. 100 ibid. 
JOI Ibid. There are also more minor TRIPS-plus commitment� relating to digital tc:chnology protection and 
tra<lc:marks and geographical indications. Ibid. 
102 AAN7.FfA, Chapter 14, art.4. 103 Ibid., art. 1(4). 104 Ibid., art. 2. 
130 MEREDITH KOT.SKY LEWIS 14. General provisions and exceptions AANZFTA incorporates GA TT Article XX and GA'J'S Article XIV with respect to certain chapters, as well as exceptions for essential security interests, certain tax measures, and for balance of payments issues.105 There is an explicit acknowledge­menL of New Zealand's right to give more favorable treatment to the Maori, con­sistent with its obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi, and the interpretation of New Zealand's commitments under that Treaty are not subject to AANZFTA dispute settlement.106 15. Consultations and dispute settlement The AANZFTA dispute settlement mechanism, like the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, provides for binding dispute settlement with the possibility of sus­pending concessions in the event of noncompliance.107 Tn the event of consultations not resolving a dispute, a Party can request the establishment of an arbitral tribunal to hear the matter, and there are provisions for the participation of interested third parties. '08 As under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding, a party found to be in violation of an AANZF'l'A obligation will have a reasonable time, generally not exceeding 15 months, in which to comply.109 failure to so comply will then trigger the right of the prevailing parly eilher to a negotiated level of compensation or to suspend concessions.110 There is no appellate mechanism in AANZFTA dispute settlement. IV. Impact and prospects for future application AANZF!'A confirms that nothing in the Agreement can be construed as derogating from any rights or obligations that the parties already have as WTO members (Chapter 18, Article 2) and that the parties will undertake a general review of the Agreement, with a view to furthering its objectives, in 2016 (and every five years after that) (Chapter 18, Article 9). 111 The Agreement was notified to the WTO as a regional trade agreement under GATT Article XXIV (trade in goods) and GATS Article V (trade in services) on 8 April 2010.112 The parties notified the entry into force of the Agreement for Indonesia, Laos and Cambodia on 3 May 2012.113 Article XX of the WTO's General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and Article XIV of the GATS are incorporated into AANZFTA in relation to certain chapters (Chapter 15, Article 1). 105 AANZl'TA, ChapLer 15, ans. 1-4. 106 Ibid., art. 5. 107 AANZPTA, Clrnpkr 17. 108 Ibid., arts. 8 and l 0. 109 ibid., arl. 15. 11 0 lbi d., arl. 1 7. 111 lbid., al 49. 112 http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicA.llRTAList.aspx. Accessed 27 September 2013. 113 See Nolir.calio,, of entry into force for Cambodia, Lao PDR and Indonesia of the Agreement establishing the ASliAN ... Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area, WT/RFG284/N/2 S/C/N/545/A<ld.l. (9 May 2012). 
131 THE ASF.AN· AUS1'RAT.TA-NEW ZliAI.AND FTA (AANZF'I'A) A. implications of other FTAs under negotiation A signi.ficant development that will impact AANZFTA in the future is the recent initiation of negotiations of a separate Fl'A that will include, among others, all of the AANZFTA parties. This negotiation, known as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), presently comprises 16 countries: Lhe ten members of ASEAN, plus Australia, New Zealand, China, Japan, Korea and India. ASEAN al.ready has FTAs with all of the other participants; in addition to AANZFTA, ASEAN has"+ 1" agree­ments with each of China, Japan, Korea and India. However, these existing FTAs are a series of hub-and-spoke arrangements, without many linkages beh-veen the spokes. The RCEP negotiating parties seek to change this, and to create a single FTA that will I ink all 16 participants to one another. This negotiation is still in its earliest stages114 and is likely to proceed rather slowly because of the challenges in getting China, Japan and Korea to negotiate successfully with one another, and because India has yet to partici­pate in an FTA of even moderately high standards. Should the RCEP come to fruition however, it will encompass all of the AANZFTA participants. This has potentially significant implications for the interpretation of the obliga­tions of the 12 countries that will be parties to both AANZFTA and the RCEP. As noted in Part III above, the provisions in Chapter 18, Article 2 of AAN1/.FTA describing the relationship between AAKZFl'A and other treaties explicitly excluded future treaties from the coverage of that Article. Thus unless the parties provide for otherwise in the RCRP, pursuant to Article 30 of the VCLT, after the RCEP comes into force, AANZFTA will only apply to the extent its terms are compatible with those of the RCEP. However, AANZFTA may remain relevant, albeit to a limited degree, even if the RCEP is completed and comes into force. To the extent differences such as the way rules of origin are calculated result in one agreement being more attractive for an exporter than the other, it is likely such exporters will be able to choose the agreement they wish to export under. l n particular, members of over­lapping FTAs have used side letters to ensure that exporters from parties to such FT As can take advantage of whichever terms are more favorable to them.115 It is not always the case that the later agreement will be more advantageous. A New Zealand study has conclude<l that for businesses seeking to export to countries with which New Zealand has one or more FTAs in addition to AANZFTA,116 it will usually be 
114 The first negotialing session wns held \I· -13 May 2013. See A SEAN, Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership (RCEP) Joint Statement: The Firsl Meeting of Trade Negotiating Committee (10 May 2013) 
accessible al www.asean.org/news/asean-statement-comrnuniques/itcm/regional-comprehensive-eco 
nomic-partnership-rcep-joint-slatemcnt-Lhe-first-mecting-of-trade-negotiat ing-comrnittcc. 
115 See, e.g., NZIER Report to MFAT, /\ Comparison of New Zealand's Trade Agrnemeuts in SE Asia: Key Corisiderat/011s for New Zea/find Exporters 7 (July 2010), accessible at www.asean.fta.govt.nz/assets/ 
Uploads/NZ! ERComparisonofll'T Aprovisions-linal27 Ausust l .pdf [hereinafter "NZIER Report"). 
116 These are Austrn.li.a (CER); Brunei (P4); Malaysia (New Zealond-Maln)•sia Fl'A); Singup()re (New 
Zealand-Singapore CEP and P4): and Thailand (New Zenland-ThBi CEP). "P4" is a term commonly 
used to refer to the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership Agreement, an FTA comprising Brw1ei, 
Chile, New Zealand and Singapore. The P4 came Into force in 2006. 
132 MEREDI'L'H KOLSKY LIJWJS to the exporters' benefit to ship under a different applicable FTA than AANZFT A.117 For example, the study determined that the goods provisions in the New Zealand­Thai CEP were generally more favorable to New Zealand exporters than those under AANZFTA, and the goods provisions under the New Zealand-Malaysia FTA were in all instances at least as favorable and in many instances more favorable than under AANZFTA.118 Better provisions were the result of more favorable tariffs and/or easier to meet rules of origin. The study also identified some ways in which AANZFTA represents the better option. For example, Mode 4 services commitments made by Singapore are more generous under AANZFT A than under the bilateral PTA (and Mode 4 services commitments are not a part of the P4).119 It remains to be seen what aspects of the RCEP will be more ambitious than AANZFTA. However, it seems likely that provision will be made for exporters from the 12 AANZFTA countries to be able to avail themselves of the more favorable agreement. Exporters will then need to determine, on a case-by-case basis, which agreement better meets their needs. In addition, six of the AANZFTA parties (Australia, Brunei, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, Vietnam) are also amongst the participants negotiating the Trans-Paci.fie Partnership (TPP).120 Assuming the TPP is concluded, it will almost certainly contain provisions that address the impact of the Agreement on existing FT As, as the 12 countries negotiating the TPP have a multitude of FT As amongst themselves. AANZFT A is a fairly basic FT A which does not feature particularly novel or comprehensive commitments. Nonetheless, the parties likely sought to negotiate this agreement primarily for strategic rather than economic reasons. The existence of AANZFT A likely simplified the case to have the RCEP include Australia and New Zealand - which was not always a given. In addition, although the phase-out periods are lengthy, the developing country participants have on the whole made significant commitments to cut tariffs, with out the sorts of wholesale sectoral exclusions featur­ing in many other FT As. 
117 NZIER Report at 8 -12. 
118 Ibid., al 8. See also Bryan Mercurio, 'Trade Liberalisation in Asia: Why Intra-Asian free Trade 
Agreements are Not Utilised by the Business Community', 6 Asian Journal of WTO & International 
Ilea/th Law and Policy (J) 109 (2011). 
119 Ibid., at 10. 
120 The TPP participants that are not also parties to AANZFl'A are Canada, Chile, Japan, Mexico, Peru an<l 
Lbe Unii.ed States. 
